Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations

Citations Over TimeTop 10% of 1980 papers

Abstract

Positive and negative selective incentives are shown analytically to have different structural implications when used to induce collective action. Positive selective incentives are effective for motivating small numbers of cooperators and generate pressures toward smaller, more "elite" actions, unless the incentives have jointness of supply. Negative selective incentives are effective for motivating unanimous cooperation, but their use is often uneven and cyclical and may generate hostilities which disrupt the cooperation they enforce. Examples of these dynamics are found in many arenas of collective action and social movements.

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