Experiment and Animal Minds: Why the Choice of the Null Hypothesis Matters
Philosophy of Science2015Vol. 82(5), pp. 1059–1069
Citations Over TimeTop 1% of 2015 papers
Abstract
In guarding against inferential mistakes, experimental comparative cognition errs on the side of underattributing sophisticated cognition to animals, or what I refer to as the underattribution bias . I propose eliminating this bias by altering the method of choosing the default, or null , hypothesis. Rather than choosing the most parsimonious null hypothesis, as is current practice, I argue for choosing the best-evidenced hypothesis. Doing so at once preserves the risk-controlling structure of the current statistical paradigm and introduces a sensitivity to probability-conferring empirical and theoretical information. This analysis illustrates how values like parsimony can covertly shape statistical-experimental design and inference.