Variable Specific Factors and the “X‐Efficiency Cost” of Protection *
Review of International Economics1993Vol. 1(3), pp. 234–242
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Abstract
Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of protection on X‐efficiency using a general equilibrium Ricardo‐Viner model with variable sector‐specific effort. As in earlier models, it is found that protection only reduces effort if the income effect is sufficiently strong. It is also shown that, provided the correct compensated import demand curve is used, all welfare effects attributable to changes in effort are captured in the standard “triangle” measure of deadweight loss. Moreover, any protection‐induced fall in effort will reduce the overall cost of protection, suggesting that policy‐induced “X‐inefficiency” may be beneficial.
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