Existentialism and the Degrees of Knowledge
Abstract
EXISTENTIALISM AND THE DEGREES Of KNOWLEDGE IN an issue of THE THOMIST of some time ago, Professor Max Charlesworth has shown, in an article on The Meaning of Existentialism, how " certain principles and distinctions drawn from the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas . . . provide a perspective for the proper appreciation of the importance of Existentialism." 1 Professor Charlesworth's main conclusions, if I understand him correctly, are to the effect that "the findings of the Existentialists are of value and can ... be integrated into an authentic philosophy of man," and that "so long as the Existentialists keep to their own proper sphere . . . their conclusions are valid and valuable." 2 But what are we to understand, in that context, by " integration "? In what sense is it true, as Prof. Charlesworth affirms, that some existentialist conclusions are " valid and valuable"? Evidently, he does not mean that existentialism can be integrated with an authentic philosophy of the nature of man by way of fusion or merger; otherwise he would not warn us of the " fundamental confusion of Existentialism " between the metaphysical and the existential, and that " the error of the Existentialists consists in merging the metaphysical order into the existential order." 3 The implication, it seems, is that there is some distinction between these two orders: if so, what is this distinction and how can the two orders of knowledge be integrated? And again, evidently Prof. Charlesworth does not believe that some conclusions of existentialism are valid as they stand and as they are meant by the existentialists; 1 M. Charlesworth, " The Meaning of Existentialism," THE THOMIST, XVI (1958)' 472-496; p. 472. • Ibid., p. 494. 8 Ibid., pp. 486 and 490. 193 194 LESLIE DEWART otherwise he would not warn us of the " absurdities " and " errors " of existentialism. The implication is, it seems, that the doctrines of existentialism must be understood only in a certain way and in a certain context before they can be considered valid and valuable: they must be understood, as he puts it, in " their own proper sphere." But precisely what is the proper sphere of existentialism? Thus, Prof. Charlesworth's "a priori" approach not only puts in relief for us the importance of existentialism and suggests that Thomists should not dismiss existentialism too airily lest they get rid of the wheat along with the chaff, but also raises further problems. It raises the problem, particularly, of how Thomism can profit, if at all, by re-adapting existentialism to itself in accordance with its own needs; that is, by incorporating or digesting, if such an " integration " is possible, whatever there may be of truth in existentialism. Therefore, the enquiry which logically follows after Prof. Charlesworth's article is to examine more closely the nature of existentialism and its relations to the various philosophical sciences in order to conclude whether, and if so, under what conditions, it may be considered valid philosophical knowledge. That is precisely the purpose of this study, namely, to present and explore the question whether existentialism has a valid place within the hierarchy of the philosophical sciences as described and explained by Thomistic philosophy. I INTRODUCTION We must note from the outset that although existentialism offers itself as a full-fledged system of philosophy, or indeed, sometimes as the only valid system of philosophy, we need not take existentialism's own conception and appraisal of itself in order to recognize its peculiar contribution, if any, to the perennial stream of philosophical knowledge itself. We are not required to take the existentialist's word at face value when he offers a substitute for metaphysics or for ethics or for EXISTENTIALISM AND THE DEGREES OF KNOWLEDGE 195 philosophy as a whole. It may well be that the real novelty and true philosophical value of existentialism, if any, do not consist in its being a new way to solve old problems, but rather in its being a new way to approach new problems and to attempt their solution from its own particular viewpoint. Very especially , the fact that existentialism deals with being-or, perhaps, even with being as being-need not mean that existentialism must be taken as a metaphysics or not at all. It is true that existentialists...