Logical Concepts vs. Logical Operations
Abstract
In what follows, the difference between Frege’s and Schröder’s understanding of logical connectives will be investigated. It will be argued that Frege thought of logical connectives as concepts, whereas Schröder thought of them as operations. For Frege, logical connectives can themselves be connected. There is no substantial difference between the connectives and the concepts they connect. Frege’s distinction between concepts and objects is central to this conception, because it allows a method of concept formation which enables us to form concepts from the logical connectives alone. Schröder in contrast unifies the distinction between concepts and objects (which he calls elements and relatives), but keeps the distinction between logical connectives and what they connect. It will be argued that Frege’s particular way of perceiving logical connectives is crucial for his foundational project.
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