A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
The Quarterly Journal of Economics1983Vol. 98(3), pp. 371–371
Citations Over TimeTop 1% of 1983 papers
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful: both are produced by the competition for political favors.
Related Papers
- → Development of the Wrestling Competition Analysis Form According to the Latest Competition Rules(2017)22 cited
- Causes of and Solutions for the Keen Competition for Source of Student between Schools of Higher Education(2008)
- On Idea of Dislocating Competition of Non-Public Universities(2003)
- Discussion on the Construction of Subject Competition System in College(2009)
- Tentative Idea on Holding the Competition to Win the Top Laurels of Sanda in Shenyang Institute of Physical Education(2003)