The American Theory of International Arbitration

American Journal of International Law1908Vol. 2(2), pp. 387–391

Charles Noble Gregory, Robert Lansing, N Watertown, William Morrow, San Francisco, Cal Leo, Suzanne E. Rowe, Oscar Straus, D George, Glenn V. Wilson, Sharon Woolsey, David Hill, The Hague, European Managing Editor, James Brown, James Brown

Abstract

The United States has been and is a partisan -we might almost say a violent partisan -of international arbitration. In times past it has submitted individual cases to arbitration and has expressed a willingness, indeed a profound desire, to bind itself to submit all cases susceptible of judicial treatment, and of a nature to be submitted, to international arbitration. Various general treaties of arbitration were negotiated in 1904 and were ratified by the Senate of the United States, with an amendment, however, which required for the establishment of the compromis the conclusion of a treaty. This would necessitate, therefore, the negotiation of an individual treaty in order to submit a question to arbitration which the contracting parties had already bound themselves to submit. There would be thus involved the delay incident to the conclusion of the treaty, and the exchange of ratifications would necessarily prolong the delay.

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