Information Asymmetries and Adverse Selection in the Market for Individual Medical Expense Insurance
Journal of Risk & Insurance1993Vol. 60(2), pp. 300–300
Citations Over TimeTop 12% of 1993 papers
Abstract
Mark J. Browne, Helen I. Doerpinghaus, Information Asymmetries and Adverse Selection in the Market for Individual Medical Expense Insurance, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 300-312
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