On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System
The RAND Journal of Economics1999Vol. 30(2), pp. 181–181
Citations Over TimeTop 10% of 1999 papers
Abstract
The patent system is mainly a renewal system: the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees. I ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research. In such a model I show that renewal mechanisms (possibly with subsidies) are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on, regardless of the objective function. Under plausible circumstances, patents should have a uniform life, rather than varying in length, as typically occurs under a renewal system.
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