Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Econometrica1991Vol. 59(6), pp. 1713–1713
Citations Over TimeTop 10% of 1991 papers
Abstract
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported.All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring.With imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the interest rate is small.
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