Optimal sequential contests
Theoretical Economics2024Vol. 19(1), pp. 207–244
Citations Over TimeTop 10% of 2024 papers
Abstract
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first‐mover advantage, there is an earlier‐mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.
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