Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions
Journal of Labor Economics2002Vol. 20(1), pp. 42–58
Citations Over TimeTop 10% of 2002 papers
Abstract
A two‐period, career‐concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker’s ability is analyzed. Contracts are unobservable, but incomes are observable. It is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover.
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